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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (10:03 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4 argument first in Case 12-99. Unite Here Local 355 v.
5 Mulhall.

6 Mr. McCracken?

7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD G. McCracken

8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

9 MR. McCracken: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
10 it please the Court:

11 Many employers and unions find agreements
12 such as this useful to avoid conflict during organizing
13 campaigns. They are efficient. They avoid the hard
14 feelings that come in many contested organizing
15 campaigns and thereby create a good environment for
16 collective bargaining. They serve the core objectives
17 of the Labor Management Relations Act, those being
18 freedom of contracts, organizing employees for
19 collective bargaining, and labor peace.

20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I -- I think there's
21 substantial force to that argument. But can we talk
22 just about property just for a minute, just in the
23 abstract? Isn't it true that what you have might become
24 property when you trade it? If you take a picture of a
25 celebrity on a street, that's your right to do so. But

1 you can't sell it. Maybe that's not quite the -- the
2 right analogy. But here, what, as you point out, is
3 fairly standard in labor relations, has been turned into
4 property, arguably, by the parties.

5 Could the parties say that we'll pay you --
6 the employer say we'll pay you \$100,000 to get out of
7 the recognition agreement? That would be property in an
8 economist sense. Now, it might be a violation of the
9 Labor Act.

10 MR. McCRACKEN: Yeah. That example would
11 definitely be a violation of Section 302. If the
12 employer gave the union \$100,000 to not organize, that
13 would be exactly like the Ventimiglia case from 1957
14 from the Fourth Circuit.

15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But in the abstract,
16 wouldn't that be property?

17 MR. McCRACKEN: They -- money is property.
18 We don't dispute that at all.

19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And isn't the thing that's
20 exchanged for the money also property?

21 MR. McCRACKEN: The -- this statute focuses
22 on what is paid, lent or delivered by the employer to --

23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I'm just talking about
24 common definition, our common agreement as to what
25 property means.

1 MR. McCracken: In this case, the all -- the
2 only thing given by the union was a promise not to
3 strike, picket or boycott this business, to help supply
4 labor if the employer needed it, not to coerce or
5 threaten employees in the course of the organizing
6 effort and to -- and to arbitrate in the event that
7 there was any dispute.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And the list -- the
9 list of -- the list of employees.

10 MR. McCracken: Yes. That's what the
11 employer promised to give to the union. And I was
12 describing the things the union gave in response --

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Oh, I see.

14 MR. McCracken: Because it was a mutual
15 agreement.

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: What -- what about support
17 of the legislation to permit slot machines? Was that a
18 promise that the union made?

19 MR. McCracken: It is so alleged and there's
20 no question that the union did tell the employer and the
21 other employers that it would work to pass the
22 legislation necessary for these employers to get into
23 business in the first place. Thereby serving their
24 interest and also the union's interest in having an
25 industry and workers in the industry to represent.

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: But as the case comes to
2 us, we assume that there was such a commitment by the
3 union.

4 MR. McCracken: Yes, Your Honor.

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.

6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So suppose the company
7 manufactures widgets and the union says, we'll spend
8 \$100,000 advertising your widgets if you so -- if you
9 sign the recognition agreement.

10 MR. McCracken: Yes. I think --

11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is that lawful?

12 MR. McCracken: It would be lawful because
13 the union would not have received any widgets. It would
14 not have received any kind of property from the
15 employer. It would simply have promised to help the
16 employer in business, something that happens a great
17 deal in labor relations.

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, there would have been
19 a quid pro quo for that, certainly. I mean, the union
20 wouldn't promise that for nothing. It would get
21 something in exchange such as, as in this case, the
22 right to go on the employer's property to -- to recruit
23 union members or -- or some other thing of value from
24 the employer, right?

25 MR. McCracken: Unquestionably. And this,

1 as I say, happens a lot with --

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why isn't that the
3 property that Justice Kennedy referred to? They -- the
4 union paid \$100,000 to get the items that the employer
5 gave them. So aren't they valued, something tangible,
6 valued for what the union paid for it?

7 MR. McCRACKEN: They are desired by the
8 union. That does not make them things of value that are
9 paid, lent and delivered by employers --

10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But why? Well, the --
11 the argument that Justice Scalia and Kennedy are
12 referring to it, is that the employer paid with the
13 employee list, the access to the facility, the promises
14 not to strike to get the 100,000.

15 MR. McCRACKEN: And --

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I think that is the
17 essence of -- because the union paying money is not a
18 violation of the Act.

19 MR. McCRACKEN: The -- there's no
20 prohibition against the union paying money to an
21 employer.

22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Right.

23 MR. McCRACKEN: It's only the other way
24 around. And in this case, the union spent \$100,000 of
25 time of its staff knocking on doors exercising its

1 speech and petition rights in order to get this
2 legislation passed so that the employer could get into
3 business.

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. McCracken, the
5 Respondent's brief here asserts that these kinds of
6 precertification agreements have only been common since
7 the -- the '90s. Is that accurate to you?

8 MR. McCracken: It is not, Justice Scalia.
9 There -- there's an article from the Cornell Industrial
10 Labor Relations Department by Eaton and Chriskey showing
11 that these agreements go back to the 1970s. Also in the
12 Sixth Circuit's -- the Dana Corporation case, you'll see
13 that there's an explanation that the neutrality
14 agreement between Dana and the UAW was first signed in
15 1976. So these go back quite a bit further.

16 Also, they really go back in a rudimentary
17 way much further than that to the Lion Dry Goods case,
18 which was a -- an agreement with a non-incumbent union
19 and department store employers in Cleveland that
20 provided, among other things, for access.

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Sometimes there's a
22 conflict between two different groups that want to
23 unionize the same workforce, right?

24 MR. McCracken: Yes.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How would this work

1 in that case? Let's say the employer gave -- entered in
2 an agreement like this with one union that wanted to
3 organize the same workforce but not the other.

4 MR. McCracken: The NLRB has dealt with that
5 quite a few times and takes the position and has
6 required employers to give equal rights to both unions.

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Doesn't that suggest
8 it's a thing of value in -- in this context?

9 MR. McCracken: It's certainly not a thing
10 of value in the sense of marketability, because the one
11 union could not sell it to the second union because the
12 other union could get it free from the employer because
13 the employer must give equal rights to all comers.

14 JUSTICE KAGAN: In the typical case, how
15 important is an agreement like this to the union? How
16 much does it increase the likelihood that the union will
17 be selected as the exclusive bargaining representative?

18 MR. McCracken: The same article that I
19 mentioned, Justice Kagan, shows that the differential is
20 between about -- about 67 percent success rate in NLRB
21 elections and about a 76 percent success rate under
22 these agreements.

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Are the
24 agreements -- are the agreements uniform or do they have
25 varying elements?

1 MR. McCracken: There are some things that
2 are quite standard.

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is -- is the card
4 check provision standard?

5 MR. McCracken: It is found in most
6 agreements, neutrality somewhat less so, but still in
7 the vast majority of them.

8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I don't -- I think this is
9 slightly different from Justice Kagan, but can you give
10 us some indication of how often employers make these
11 agreements? That's probably a hard statistic to -- to
12 collect because there are so many variables.

13 MR. McCracken: Yes. But I can -- I can
14 tell you from my experience, if I may, that these
15 agreements are prevalent in the hospitality industry
16 both in hotels and casinos, and that all of the major
17 hotel companies have entered into these and the major
18 casino companies as well.

19 JUSTICE KAGAN: Why is that?

20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. McCracken, could
21 you -- could you tell -- tell us about this particular
22 contract, because as far as I can fathom from what we
23 have it expired at least a year ago and there was --
24 there was no recognition, there was no election; is that
25 right?

1 MR. McCracken: Yes, that's correct.

2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So, are we dealing with a
3 live case considering that the -- the agreement has
4 expired?

5 MR. McCracken: Justice Ginsburg, the
6 complaint in this case prays for two different forms of
7 relief. One is that the provisions of this agreement
8 not be honored. But the second is that the union never
9 demand or request or receive any of these things, that
10 is neutrality, names and addresses, or access,
11 regardless of an agreement.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So what would be -- what
13 would be the relief?

14 MR. McCracken: The relief -- if this case
15 went forward and was found meritorious, the relief would
16 be an injunction against the union from ever asking an
17 employer for -- this employer for neutrality or for the
18 names and addresses of employees or for any form of
19 access to the premises and not --

20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Because -- is it on the
21 theory that it did it once, so it might do it again? Is
22 that --

23 MR. McCracken: The -- I believe that the
24 theory that the plaintiff has here is that an employer
25 may never give these things, whether it's in an

1 agreement or not in an agreement, that even if -- pardon
2 me.

3 JUSTICE ALITO: Would Mr. Mulhall have to
4 face an imminent threat in order for him to have
5 standing?

6 MR. McCracken: He would, Your Honor.

7 JUSTICE ALITO: And why is the threat
8 imminent at this time?

9 MR. McCracken: I'm sorry?

10 JUSTICE ALITO: Why is the threat imminent
11 at this time?

12 MR. McCracken: Your Honor, we -- we
13 advocated during an earlier phase of this case that
14 there was no standing.

15 JUSTICE ALITO: What is your position now?

16 MR. McCracken: We -- we still do not
17 believe that he has standing, because there is no
18 imminent harm here. The harm that he -- he alleges is
19 that he will be ultimately forced into a collective
20 bargaining situation that he doesn't want. However,
21 that could only occur if the union succeeded in
22 convincing a majority of his co-employees that they
23 should unionize and the employer gave recognition and
24 the collective bargaining agreement was negotiated.
25 Only -- only after -- so -- so imminence is -- is very

1 distant here.

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Did you also raise in an
3 earlier stage an argument that he had no private right
4 of action?

5 MR. McCracken: We did not.

6 JUSTICE KAGAN: That has never been
7 litigated?

8 MR. McCracken: It hasn't -- it has been
9 litigated. It's been -- it's a point that's been raised
10 and rejected by all the courts to consider it, largely
11 because of the Court's -- this Court's statement in
12 Atkinson versus Sinclair Refining. Now, it was dictum,
13 but it has -- it's something that has been accepted by
14 all of the courts.

15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But not in this -- not in
16 this case. It wasn't raised in this case.

17 MR. McCracken: It was not raised in this
18 case. Instead, standing was raised.

19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And Sinclair is of a
20 certain age before this Court looked more carefully at
21 the implication of private rights of action.

22 MR. McCracken: That's true, Justice
23 Ginsburg. But the Court in the DeMasse case in 1993
24 involving whether trust funds could be administered by
25 the judiciary, essentially, under Section 302(e) assumed

1 the existence of a private right of action. And the
2 Court decided that it was -- it was not proper for the
3 courts to -- to get past the point of the formation of
4 the trust and engage in trust fund administration, but
5 it was assumed that the plaintiff had a right to sue.

6 JUSTICE ALITO: Why wouldn't the right to
7 use private property in a way that otherwise wouldn't be
8 allowed constitute a thing of value? Suppose the --
9 what the employer gave the union was a lease well --
10 well below market rate on property for use as the -- as
11 a union office. Would that qualify as a thing of value?

12 MR. McCracken: It would qualify both as a
13 thing of value and one that is paid, lent, or delivered
14 by the employer to the union.

15 JUSTICE ALITO: So what's the difference
16 here? There's a -- there's the use of -- there's the
17 conveyance of a certain property right. Why doesn't
18 that constitute a thing of value?

19 MR. McCracken: Because the union really
20 only had a right of access, not any exclusive possession
21 of any property, and only for the very limited purpose
22 of communicating with employees about their Section 7
23 rights.

24 JUSTICE ALITO: But it's still -- it's a
25 lesser property right, but isn't it a property right?

1 What if the -- what if the employer sold to a catering
2 company the right to drive lunch trucks onto its
3 premises to sell sandwiches and coffee to the employees?
4 Wouldn't that be a property right?

5 MR. McCracken: Not under Florida law, Your
6 Honor. The -- because it would only, at most, be a
7 license. No interest in real property would be given.

8 Justice Alito: All right. Well, isn't a
9 license a thing of value?

10 MR. McCracken: A license may be a thing of
11 value that -- that is paid, lent or delivered. In this
12 case, there was not a license so much as there was a
13 waiver or forbearance of the employer's right to
14 exclude. The union did not receive or accept any
15 employer property. It didn't --

16 Justice Kennedy: Well, that's true of all
17 property owners. I have a right to waive my right to
18 exclude you from the property. That's -- that's
19 property -- that's a property right. And -- and it can
20 become so when I -- when I charge for it.

21 MR. McCracken: Yes. It is your property
22 right, but the union did not obtain your right to
23 exclude. It did not obtain that property right. It --
24 it obtained the right to be there to -- not to any
25 exclusive area, but your property right to exclude

1 remained in your hands.

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, it's clear that
3 there's some difficulty in defining the limits of
4 property. There are some things that I think have value
5 even though they may not have market value. For
6 example, an employer bribing a union steward by offering
7 him a favorable work schedule or -- or days off that are
8 a weekend or something that's valuable to the worker but
9 doesn't necessarily have an objective value.

10 The government cites Credit Suisse v.
11 Billing in its brief. When you get up on rebuttal, I
12 want to talk to you about the -- the law that has
13 developed in that case and why it doesn't apply here.

14 MR. McCRACKEN: Yes.

15 Thank you, Your Honor.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

17 MR. McCRACKEN: May I reserve my remaining
18 time?

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes, of course.

20 MR. McCRACKEN: Thank you very much.

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Dreeben.

22 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. DREEBEN,
23 FOR UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,
24 SUPPORTING THE PETITIONER

25 MR. DREEBEN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it

1 please the Court:

2 Section 302 cannot be read in isolation from
3 the remainder of the labor laws. The United States does
4 not dispute that if all this Court had to look at was
5 the words "thing of value" in Section 302, the promises
6 that were at issue in this case could be viewed as
7 things of value and, with a little bit of stretching of
8 the language, could be viewed as paid, lent, or
9 delivered.

10 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, before you get too
11 much into the merits, could -- does the United States
12 have a position on whether this case satisfies Article
13 3.

14 MR. DREEBEN: We don't, Justice Alito. The
15 Eleventh Circuit did hold that Mulhall had standing and
16 there -- we raised a question of whether the case is
17 moot at the certiorari stage as a reason why this Court
18 may not want to take the case. But we have not drilled
19 deeply enough into it to have a position on that
20 question.

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Does the United States
22 have a position on the implication of a private right of
23 action under 302?

24 MR. DREEBEN: Justice Ginsburg, it seems to
25 have been accepted historically and, as my co-counsel

1 mentioned, it was referenced in dictum by this Court;
2 it's been accepted by the lower courts. I think if this
3 Court were looking at the language of the statute today,
4 Section 10(e) of Section 302(e) of the statute, which is
5 on page 11a of -- of our brief, gives the district
6 courts jurisdiction to hear violations of this case --
7 of this statute, and courts have assumed that private
8 parties could invoke that.

9 If the Court were looking at that afresh,
10 I'm not sure that it would reach that result. But there
11 is a lot of ink on the page with respect to it. The
12 Eleventh Circuit did not reach that issue and it doesn't
13 seem to be squarely presented here. But what is
14 squarely presented here is whether the Court should read
15 Section 302 as a freestanding provision divorced from
16 the central policy of the labor laws and the remaining
17 provisions in the labor laws.

18 Now, as Justice Sotomayor --

19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Are you saying "thing of
20 value" means something different in 302 than it means
21 elsewhere in -- in the code?

22 MR. DREEBEN: I think --

23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I -- I can see if there
24 was a conspiracy to extort these benefits, that the
25 government would take the position that there was a

1 crime because there was a thing of value, a thing of
2 property.

3 MR. DREEBEN: Well, under this statute, the
4 government's position is that the three terms that are
5 at issue -- "neutrality," "access," and "employee list"
6 -- are not prohibited by Section 302. Probably the best
7 way to reach that conclusion is to determine that
8 Congress did not intend that these three things be
9 viewed as things of value under the statute.

10 Certainly, read in isolation, the words
11 "thing of value" are very broad. In other statutes,
12 they cover intangibles. We would have no problem
13 treating the things here as things of value under
14 statutes or under 302 if that's the only thing that
15 existed.

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Isn't Billing your best
17 argument, the framework of Billing?

18 MR. DREEBEN: Yes, I think it is, Justice
19 Sotomayor. What the Court has to do here, as it did in
20 the Billing case, is read multiple statutes together in
21 order to harmonize them. And just as in Billing, the
22 Court said, well, the antitrust laws literally do apply
23 here, the securities underwriting activity could violate
24 the antitrust laws.

25 The Court looked at it in light of other

1 policies reflected in the securities laws and determined
2 that Congress, having established an intricate framework
3 for regulation of the very same activity in the
4 securities laws, would not have intended the antitrust
5 laws to come along and supplant it.

6 And here what you have are --

7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Some people have
8 suggested that Billings is limited to the antitrust
9 area.

10 MR. DREEBEN: I don't think that --

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And how do you respond
12 to that belief and -- and how do you convince us to
13 expand the doctrine outside its traditional context?

14 MR. DREEBEN: Billing is simply an
15 application of this Court's responsibility to divine
16 Congress's intent based on language, structure, and
17 history and policy of the relevant laws. And here, all
18 of those things when read together indicate that
19 agreements by parties to set the ground rules for an
20 organizing campaign do not constitute prohibited things.

21 JUSTICE BREYER: Fine. But what is the --
22 suppose the employer had written a check for \$100,000 to
23 the union and everything else is the same. Now, you
24 ask, why did he do that? He said because they have to
25 have the money so that they can run the organizing

1 campaign along the lines that everyone wants. Is that
2 covered or not?

3 MR. DREEBEN: Yes. That would be a
4 violation.

5 JUSTICE BREYER: So then when I write the
6 opinion that says that is covered, but the access, the
7 employer lists, and the --

8 MR. DREEBEN: Neutrality.

9 JUSTICE BREYER: -- yes, and the neutrality,
10 those are not covered because. \$100,000 is, but they
11 aren't because; and then what comes after the "because"?

12 MR. DREEBEN: Two things, Justice Breyer,
13 and they're both equally important. First of all,
14 the -- the provision of money is useful to the union in
15 any number of ways and gives rise to the dangers of
16 misuse.

17 JUSTICE BREYER: No, no. We specify how
18 they're going to use it. They're going to use it just
19 the way --

20 MR. DREEBEN: It can't be -- it can't be
21 restricted in that way because the origins of Section
22 302 came from --

23 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Okay. No. Continue
24 with the because. One, because money might be a
25 go-beyond. Okay. What's the other?

1 MR. DREEBEN: The other is that reading the
2 policies of the Act as a whole, we start from the
3 proposition, which is undisputed by Respondent and
4 reveals that his purportedly literal application of
5 Section 302 just does not wash. We start from the
6 proposition that voluntary recognition of a union is not
7 only permissible under the National Labor Relations Act,
8 it's a favored element of national labor policy. The
9 voluntary reconciliation of agreement, of disputes
10 between labor and management is what this Act drives at.

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, if -- if
12 there --

13 MR. DREEBEN: If I could just finish this
14 one point, Mr. Chief justice, to answer Justice Breyer's
15 question.

16 (Laughter.)

17 MR. DREEBEN: The three procedures that are
18 at issue here are all procedures that are useful and
19 geared towards facilitating voluntary recognition and
20 are only useful for that purpose.

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: If I may?

22 MR. DREEBEN: Thank you.

23 (Laughter.)

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But if you recall
25 the point you made earlier, the point is, yes, voluntary

1 agreement, but if a majority of the workforce wants to
2 be organized and represented by that union, and the
3 argument here, as I understand it, is that this
4 agreement taints that process, in particular, by
5 allowing the card check procedure that it has been
6 argued exercises coercion against employees to support
7 the union.

8 MR. DREEBEN: Well, this Court in the Gissel
9 Packing case many years ago rejected that argument. The
10 National Labors Relation Board has rejected that
11 argument. Certainly --

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The argument that
13 the card check --

14 MR. DREEBEN: Card check agreements are
15 inherently coercive, yes. That has been rejected.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, will you --
17 will you concede that they're more coercive than a
18 secret ballot?

19 MR. DREEBEN: I don't think they're coercive
20 at all inherently. They may be --

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The union organizer
22 comes up to you and says, well, here's a card. You can
23 check I want to join the union, or two, I don't want a
24 union. Which will it be? And there's a bunch of your
25 fellow workers gathered around as you fill out the card.

1 MR. DREEBEN: Well, some would argue --

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: And he's a big guy.

3 (Laughter.)

4 MR. DREEBEN: Some would argue that
5 employers also have big guys and it's very coercive to
6 have your employer in there on the factory floor
7 reminding employees daily that they're very anti-union
8 and that there are a lot of costs to joining a union.
9 And so the -- the process here is one in which, yes, the
10 parties can go to the National Labor Relations Board and
11 have an election. But this Court in the Gissel Packing
12 case, backed up by decades of Board law, has validated
13 that card check agreements are perfectly legitimate and
14 may facilitate the employees' free exercise of their
15 choice to have a union.

16 The agreement in this case doesn't recognize
17 the union. All the agreement does is establish a
18 perfectly lawful process, which Respondent concedes
19 would be a thing of value, but he then has to carve it
20 out from Section 302, a voluntary recognition agreement.
21 And the access that is given to the property, which is
22 something that employers lawfully can do -- it's their
23 property, they have the right to do it -- they provide
24 it so that the employees can get information from the
25 union about unionization. And the employee list serves

1 the same thing.

2 And these things -- access, employee list,
3 neutrality -- have been elements of Federal labor policy
4 for decades.

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: One curious thing about
6 the Eleventh Circuit's opinion is it didn't reject.
7 It's a -- it's a curious opinion and we are at an
8 interlocutory stage. But the opinion reads: "Employers
9 and unions may set ground rules for an organizing
10 campaign even if the employer and union benefit from the
11 agreement." So that the Eleventh Circuit seemed to
12 agree that these agreements are enforceable. But it
13 said that it can -- they can become illegal if used in a
14 scheme to corrupt.

15 MR. DREEBEN: All of the courts of appeals,
16 Justice Ginsburg, have concluded that ground rules
17 agreements are inherently lawful. The Eleventh Circuit
18 added a motive-based limitation on it that responded to
19 a policy that's just not reflected in the language of
20 the Act.

21 JUSTICE SCALIA: What about slot machines?
22 You -- you mentioned all of the other things promised,
23 but not -- not the promise to support legislation.

24 MR. DREEBEN: That's right. The union's
25 promises are not comprehended by Section 302. All

1 that's at issue here is whether it's a Federal crime for
2 an employer to say to a union: You guys want to
3 organize? I will let you come into my plant and address
4 the employees. In fact, better yet, we will have a
5 debate, management on one side, union on the other.
6 Come into our hall to do that. That would be a Federal
7 crime under Respondents' view.

8 Thank you.

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

10 Mr. Messenger.

11 ORAL ARGUMENT OF WILLIAM L. MESSENGER

12 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

13 MR. MESSENGER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
14 it please the Court:

15 Enforcing Section 302 in this case cannot
16 conflict with the National Labor Relations Act. As
17 UNITE admits, organizing agreements such as this are
18 meant to privatize the National Labor Relations Act and
19 avoid the representational procedures. The agreement
20 here expressly requires that the employer not petition
21 for a secret ballot election, not file unfair labor
22 practices with the National Labor Relations Board, and
23 also provide assistance to the employer -- or to the
24 union, that he has no right to receive --

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But, Mr. Messenger, you

1 are dealing with a decision that seems to uphold
2 organizing agreements. I just read the passage and all
3 that it's saying is: Find out if in this case there was
4 some corruption involved. But it does say employers and
5 unions may set ground rules even if the employer and the
6 union benefit from the agreement.

7 So you seem to be construing the Eleventh
8 Circuit decision to say something it didn't say, to say
9 that organizing agreements violate 302.

10 MR. MESSENGER: Well, I would say two
11 things. First, the issue of course are the three
12 individual provisions, not organizing agreements as a
13 whole. The three things at issue here of course is the
14 gag clause, the use of property, and the information,
15 not the agreement.

16 But secondly, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion
17 comes from its holding that this intangible assistance
18 can't be delivered, it can only be paid, and therefore,
19 the court held you needed to show consideration for
20 payment.

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Where is that?

22 MR. MESSENGER: It's at the Eleventh
23 Circuit's opinion, right above the section that you just
24 read from, where the court held that it didn't believe
25 that things could be delivered, which we disagree with,

1 but they can be paid; and therefore, if consideration is
 2 given, then you have a violation. And then it goes on
 3 to say that consideration would show that the purposes
 4 of the statute are implicated by the transaction,
 5 because in that case the union is being influenced by
 6 what the employer gave.

7 So the Eleventh Circuit, when it said that
 8 not all ground rules agreements will violate 302 was
 9 saying that if no consideration was given, there would
 10 be no payment and therefore no violation in that.

11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: It says -- it says that,
 12 at the end of that passage, curbing bribery and
 13 extortion are implicated.

14 MR. MESSENGER: Yes.

15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And said that's what --

16 MR. MESSENGER: If there is consideration.
 17 So if the employer gives this assistance and the union
 18 gives something in return -- for example, here the
 19 \$100,000 political campaign and agreement not to
 20 strike -- then it becomes a payment, because the
 21 consideration shows payment.

22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What is your position on
 23 the effect of the expiration of this agreement?

24 MR. MESSENGER: I don't believe that it
 25 renders the case moot, for two reasons, the first of

1 which is that UNITE has pending a lawsuit to compel
2 arbitration in which it is alleging violations of the
3 agreement that occurred before it expired. And one of
4 the remedies the union is seeking is to have the
5 agreement extended for a longer period of time, which is
6 a remedy it received before. And that lawsuit is
7 currently pending in Federal district court. It's been
8 stayed pending these proceedings.

9 And then the second reason is UNITE
10 continues to demand this organizing assistance.
11 302(b)(1) makes it illegal for a union to demand a thing
12 of value, even if it doesn't receive it. UNITE here is
13 clearly still demanding that Mardi Gras help it organize
14 its employees, so Mulhall still has standing to seek
15 injunctive relief to stop the union from demanding those
16 things.

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Messenger, could --
18 could all of these things that the employer gave to the
19 union be included in a finally-negotiated collective
20 bargaining agreement? Couldn't that CBA say that the
21 union shall have the ability to approach employees on
22 the site, that the union shall have access to the
23 employee list of the employer -- and what else, what's
24 the third -- and that the employer will not -- will not
25 seek to undermine the union? Could all of that be

1 included in a CBA?

2 MR. MESSENGER: The first two could because
3 the exceptions to 302 start to apply, the exceptions
4 found at 302(c). For example, access for union stewards
5 has been upheld under Section (c)(1), which allows for
6 access to union officials if by reason of their service
7 to the employer. And so giving a union steward use of
8 property to administer the contract and such has been
9 upheld. That case is BASF v -- BASF Wyandotte.

10 The information. During collective
11 bargaining, a union has a right to information under
12 Section AEP 5 of the National Labor Relations Act.
13 Giving that information would fall under the exception
14 found at (c)(2), which provides for the release of any
15 claim that a union may have. And so the union has a
16 legal claim to that information under the NLRA, so if
17 the employer agreed to provide it or did provide it, it
18 would fall under that exception.

19 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Messenger, do I
20 understand the structure of your argument to be as
21 follows: That whether before certification or
22 afterwards in a collective bargaining agreement along
23 the lines that Justice Scalia said, the only thing that
24 an employer can promise a union or agree to provide to a
25 union are things that are specifically authorized in

1 other parts of the labor law? Is that the structure of
2 your argument?

3 MR. MESSENGER: Yes, Your Honor. And
4 because in the collective bargaining, a union of course
5 is supposed to act as an employee representative and not
6 for itself, so most terms of collective bargaining
7 agreements go to the employees, not to the union itself.
8 302's whole purpose or primary purpose is precisely to
9 prevent such self-dealing.

10 JUSTICE KAGAN: You see, I would have
11 thought that the premise and the policies of the labor
12 laws are to encourage a wide variety of
13 employer/employee agreements, both things that are
14 listed in the labor laws, that are provided for in the
15 labor laws, but many things that are not; that the idea
16 is to get these parties together to reach agreements on
17 a wide variety of things that matter to them regardless
18 whether the labor law specifically refers to that.

19 MR. MESSENGER: Well, the structure --

20 JUSTICE KAGAN: It seems sort of turning the
21 whole thing on its head to say that the only things that
22 are allowed in terms of promises, whether in a
23 collective bargaining agreement or prior to that, are
24 the things that the law itself requires.

25 MR. MESSENGER: Well, I believe that is the

1 structure of Section 302. (A) and (b) are simply a
2 bright-line gift ban, and then (c) provides the
3 exceptions to it. And that sort of structure for a
4 conflict of interest statute is relatively common.

5 And so the common terms of collective
6 bargaining agreements either, A, deliver nothing to the
7 union itself but give things to employees such as wages,
8 or in the alternative, does go to the union, it has to
9 fall under one of the exceptions, and there's
10 numerous --

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, why don't --
12 why doesn't the Billings -- Billing framework apply
13 beautifully here?

14 MR. MESSENGER: Because --

15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What it holds is that
16 where there's a regulatory framework, and here there is,
17 that produces standards of conduct, going to Justice
18 Kagan's point, that almost all of the three things that
19 you're arguing against are standards of conduct that
20 have been approved by -- have been approved by the
21 government, and when those conflict with the separate
22 Federal statute, then they are implicitly preempted,
23 essentially.

24 Why doesn't that doctrine do the work here?

25 MR. MESSENGER: Well, for two reasons, but

1 the first and most important is that Section 302 is part
2 of the labor law. It was enacted, of course, as part of
3 the Taft-Hartley Act and amended as part of the Labor
4 Management Reporting Disclosure Act. So you're not
5 talking about two different statutory schemes, as in
6 Billing, where you had the SEC law and you had the
7 antitrust law. 302 is Federal labor law. It is every
8 bit as much a Federal labor law as any provision of the
9 National Labor Relation Act.

10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But we have conflicting
11 provisions within standard statutes anyway, so why
12 doesn't the concept behind it still apply?

13 MR. MESSENGER: The concept would if there
14 was a direct conflict between the general prohibition of
15 302 and any right granted by the National Labor
16 Relations Act. But importantly here, nothing gives
17 UNITE any right to the three things it demands from
18 Mardi Gras. So enforcing 302 in this case cannot
19 conflict with the NLRA. UNITE has no right to
20 information from Mardi Gras about its nonunion
21 employees, no right to use its property, as this Court
22 held in Lechmere, and certainly no right to control its
23 communications, as 8(c) of the National Labor Relations
24 Act says that even the NLRB can't control an employee's
25 -- an employer's communications absent a threat or

1 promise of benefit.

2 So there is no conflict here. And a
3 persuasive opinion, although obviously not binding, is
4 the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Mercy Memorial Hospital
5 where the Sixth Circuit -- in that case the general
6 counsel of the NLRB said the employer's conduct does not
7 violate the NLRA and the union brought a 302 claim
8 anyway and the Sixth Circuit said it could bring that
9 claim. 302 is meant to be independent of the National
10 Labor Relations Act because they didn't give the NLRB
11 any jurisdiction over it and doesn't preempt. And they
12 also added if it did preempt 302, 302 would be a dead
13 letter. I mean, anything Section 302 deals with will be
14 covered by the NLRA --

15 JUSTICE BREYER: It's not covering. As I
16 understand the argument it goes back to like
17 Jurisprudence 1. Can you have -- the sign says no
18 vehicles in the park. Okay? Does that apply to a Jeep
19 used as a war memorial? Answer, no. That's been the
20 law since the twelfth th century. You spilled blood in
21 the streets of Bologna, a crime, but that's not
22 applicable to the barber.

23 All right? So, here, I think what they're
24 saying is that read this statute. You don't have to get
25 into a metaphysical argument about things of value;

1 rather, those things which play a central role in the
2 organizing campaign are things that are governed by the
3 other parts of the NLRB and to throw them in here --
4 NLRA -- and to throw them in here is going to create a
5 mess.

6 Lists, access, promises to stay neutral are
7 central to many aspects of organizing campaigns, and
8 there are no more within this statute, this part of the
9 thing than the Jeep on the pedestal is part of the no
10 vehicles in the park. Now, that's what I understand
11 roughly their argument to be, if I've got it right. And
12 what is your response?

13 MR. MESSENGER: That nothing in the National
14 Labor Relations Act gives them a right to that.

15 JUSTICE BREYER: I didn't say they had a
16 right. They didn't say they had a right.

17 MR. MESSENGER: Exactly.

18 JUSTICE BREYER: What they said was the
19 kinds of property or things of value are at issue here
20 are the kinds of things that play important roles in
21 organizing campaigns. And we needn't go further than
22 that. We don't have to talk about rights to it. We
23 don't have to talk about who said what to whom. It's
24 just that these kinds of things are organizing things,
25 and therefore they're outside the scope --

1 MR. MESSENGER: But Section --

2 JUSTICE BREYER: -- just like the Jeep on
3 the pedestal.

4 MR. MESSENGER: But Section 302 was
5 specifically amended in 1959 to apply to union
6 organizing. They added Section 8(a)(2) to extend the
7 prohibition to unions that seek to represent. Section
8 8(a)(3) applies to things given to employee committees
9 to influence employees in their right to organize or
10 bargain collectively through representatives of their
11 own choosing.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes. And I suppose -- I
13 suppose that would also -- it would also follow if --
14 if -- with no indication in the text, you simply exclude
15 organizing -- the organizing part of labor law. I guess
16 it would mean that the -- the union can cut a deal with
17 the employer that if the employer gives them a freehand
18 and -- and assists them in -- in organizing, the union
19 will promise not to -- not to seek a raise in wages or
20 not to seek insurance coverage or whatever. I guess
21 that would also be part of the organizing campaign,
22 right, so it would be okay.

23 MR. MESSENGER: Yes. An organizing
24 exception -- an organizing exception to Section 302
25 would tear a massive hole in the statute. It's

1 difficult to think of anything that unions value more
2 than an employer's assistance with unionizing more
3 employees into the union.

4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Then may I ask you,
5 Mr. Messenger, to clarify, because I thought you told me
6 before that some organizing agreements are okay. Are
7 you taking the position that all organizing
8 agreements -- in other words, are you taking a position
9 in opposition to what I read from the Eleventh Circuit,
10 that organizing agreements can be valid?

11 MR. MESSENGER: Yes, because the issue, I
12 believe, with any agreement is each particular term has
13 to be looked at individually. So, for example, if the
14 issue was a particular term of a collective bargaining
15 agreement illegal, the question would be phrased, are
16 collectively bargaining agreements legal. Same thing
17 with organizing agreements. Every term is different.

18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So you -- you do you want
19 us to say that -- that to the extent that the Eleventh
20 Circuit said, "Employers and unions may set ground rules
21 for an organizing campaign, even if the employer and
22 union benefit from the agreement," you want us to say
23 that that was wrong.

24 MR. MESSENGER: Yes. Because that, again,
25 went back to its payment holding, and Mulhall's position

1 is that the Court should overrule the lower court's
2 decision that organizing assistance cannot be delivered.
3 A list of information can, of course, be delivered,
4 so --

5 JUSTICE KAGAN: So, Mr. Messenger, just to
6 make sure I understand that, you're saying that
7 regardless of whether there was a bargain in this case,
8 forget the bargain. Let's just say that there was an
9 employer. This employer said, you know, I think that my
10 employees should have a right to listen to you and to
11 decide for themselves whether they want to be
12 represented by -- by the union, so I'm inviting the
13 union onto my premises. Just simple as that. You're
14 saying that the employer cannot do that.

15 MR. MESSENGER: That's correct.
16 Consideration, obviously, can show value, and it could
17 show towards the purpose of the statute. But 30 --

18 JUSTICE KAGAN: But we -- we don't need
19 this. I mean, you say --

20 MR. MESSENGER: Yes.

21 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- of course, this is
22 important to the union, so your argument is that it
23 falls within the statute, regardless of whether there's
24 any consideration or quid pro quo.

25 MR. MESSENGER: Exactly. Sorry.

1 JUSTICE KAGAN: I'm sorry.

2 MR. MESSENGER: Exactly. Because 302 is
3 structured not as a bribery statute that requires a quid
4 pro quo. It's a gift ban to ensure --

5 JUSTICE KAGAN: So this is to say that the
6 National Labor Relations Act prohibits employers from
7 providing access to their premises, from granting a
8 union a list of employees, or from declaring itself
9 neutral as to a union election.

10 MR. MESSENGER: Yes, with caveats. The --
11 with the first two, it could fall into exceptions in
12 other circumstances. For, again, during a collective
13 bargaining relationship, some of the exceptions start to
14 apply to the information and use of property. And going
15 towards the communications, if an employer unilaterally
16 said, I'm not going to say anything. I don't have the
17 time or money to fight the union, it can do so. But if
18 an employer contractually agrees and gives the union
19 control over its speech, then yes, a thing of value --

20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you acknowledge that
21 your -- that your answer to Justice Kagan is -- is
22 contrary to years of settled practices and
23 understandings?

24 MR. MESSENGER: No, Your Honor, I don't
25 believe that it is. And if this is going back --

1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: In other words, this kind
2 of an agreement is very rare?

3 MR. MESSENGER: It's not rare now. It's
4 only become prevalent in the 1990s to go --

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And it has -- it has been
6 enforced under 301. So it -- it would be odd to say
7 that an agreement that is enforceable that court --
8 courts haven't enforced agreements just like this under
9 301 are criminal under 302.

10 MR. MESSENGER: The exact opposite is true.
11 Section 301 gives courts jurisdiction to enforce any
12 agreement between a labor organization and an employer.
13 302 makes it illegal for an employer to agree to deliver
14 something to a union.

15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Have -- have courts
16 enforced agreements just like this one under 301?

17 MR. MESSENGER: Many times. However, 302
18 was not raised in those cases. So would they have
19 enforced the agreement if it was alleged that it was --
20 violated 302? That, of course, is the question before
21 this Court.

22 JUSTICE BREYER: The question is the same, I
23 think. And to go back, I thought the most clear
24 statement of your view was when you said to Justice
25 Scalia that if we don't accept your interpretation,

1 there's a hole in the statute.

2 MR. MESSENGER: Yes. And this --

3 JUSTICE BREYER: In fact, I think you said a
4 big hole.

5 MR. MESSENGER: Yes. And this would
6 actually create a larger hole --

7 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. Now --

8 MR. MESSENGER: -- because of anything
9 enforceable --

10 JUSTICE BREYER: I get the point.

11 MR. MESSENGER: I'm sorry.

12 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm focusing on the hole.

13 MR. MESSENGER: Yes.

14 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, I thought the area
15 that you're calling a hole is an area where the National
16 Labor Relations Act gives the National Labor Relations
17 Board all kinds of authority to set rules and to say
18 what is an appropriate practice and not. Am I right
19 about that?

20 MR. MESSENGER: To a degree, yes, but 302
21 always covers --

22 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. If the answer
23 is yes, and I'm sure there's some qualification, but if
24 the heart of the answer is yes, then it's the contrary
25 that creates the hole, because if we throw those things

1 which are central to the NLRA's regulatory power into
2 this particular provision, the NLRA loses the power to
3 say when they're okay, when they're not okay, to make a
4 thousand qualifications.

5 Hence, the NLRA's regulatory provisions and
6 this case are the Jeep on the pedestal or the barber in
7 the street. Even though I have to tell you, in Bologna
8 in the 18th century, despite the exception of the eighth
9 century, it did not mention barbers specifically in the
10 statute. They had to be read in by the courts.

11 (Laughter.)

12 MR. MESSENGER: The difference, Your
13 Honor -- I can't speak for Bologna, but 302 is meant to
14 govern labor relations --

15 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.

16 MR. MESSENGER: -- including organizing,
17 including collective bargaining. So anything that the
18 NLRB -- what do you call it? -- has coverage over, 302
19 also covers it. So, for example --

20 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Messenger, suppose that
21 there was a -- a union and it was striking. And the
22 union goes to the employer and -- and they reach
23 agreement, and the agreement is the union will stop
24 striking if the employer agrees to sit down and
25 negotiate with the union. So that's the promise that

1 the employer makes to the union. I'm going to sit down
2 and negotiate with you. And that's, obviously, a thing
3 of important value to the union. Is that also
4 prohibited?

5 MR. MESSENGER: No, because in that case,
6 there's no thing that's actually be given to the union,
7 especially if you're talking about negotiating a
8 collectively bargaining agreement, which, of course,
9 those benefits go to employees.

10 JUSTICE KAGAN: There's no thing that's
11 given to the union? I mean, I would think if your
12 argument is thing of value is anything that's of value,
13 there's nothing that's of greater value to the union
14 than an employer's agreement to negotiate.

15 MR. MESSENGER: But the question becomes
16 negotiate what? So if the question is let's negotiate
17 over employee wages, wages go to employees, there's
18 nothing there. On the other hand, if they say we will
19 negotiate over how much money we'll pay you to stop
20 striking, well, then that's illegal under 302.

21 So it just begs the question or raises the
22 question -- I'm sorry -- of what comes next after
23 that agreement to negotiate.

24 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I guess -- I mean,
25 we're going to negotiate about all kinds of things,

1 things -- things that unions and employers negotiate
2 about, and that's of great benefit to the union. The
3 union gets to turn around to all its employees and say:
4 Look at this, the employer is going to sit down and talk
5 with us.

6 MR. MESSENGER: I would say in that case,
7 even if it did have value, no thing is delivered to the
8 union. Because 302 --

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, benefits -- benefits
10 to the employees always benefit the union. I mean,
11 that's -- you know, that's automatic, it seems to me. I
12 don't understand how you say that this is just a gift
13 statute and there doesn't have to be any, anything on
14 the other side, no quid pro quo. You say it's perfectly
15 okay if the -- if the employer allows the union to come
16 on his premises to recruit members, but it's not okay
17 for him to agree, to agree to do so?

18 MR. MESSENGER: No.

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't understand what
20 that means.

21 MR. MESSENGER: No, Your Honor. It would be
22 illegal to agree or to do that. So if an employer
23 didn't agree to allow the union on its property, it just
24 did, that would still be the delivery of the use of
25 property. So that's not my position.

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: And what if the employer
2 does not oppose the union, he neither speaks against it
3 nor for it? Is that giving something of value to the
4 union?

5 MR. MESSENGER: Not if he does so
6 unilaterally. But if he agrees to do so, then the
7 control is given to the union very similar to a
8 noncompete. And the agreement -- the agreement. The
9 example I used in the brief I believe is a good one. If
10 Coca-Cola decides not to run advertising against Pepsi,
11 it hasn't given anything to Pepsi. It doesn't enter
12 into a noncompete agreement.

13 JUSTICE SCALIA: It has no meaning to say
14 you agree to something when you're not getting anything
15 in return. You can promise something without getting
16 anything in return. But to agree? I think that means,
17 you know, I won't do it in exchange for something else.

18 MR. MESSENGER: And there will be
19 consideration. So the hypothetical given of the
20 employer just doing it in exchange for nothing will
21 almost never happen, as I believe UNITE says in its
22 brief --

23 JUSTICE SCALIA: But if it did happen, you'd
24 say it would be a violation.

25 MR. MESSENGER: Yes. So if the -- for

1 example, if the employer just said to the union, here's
2 a thousand dollars, just put it on the table, that's a
3 violation. It doesn't have to go any further than that.
4 Or if the union said, Give me a thousand dollars, that's
5 illegal. The employer doesn't have to hand it over.

6 But it's very unusual to have this kind of
7 organizing agreement without a quid pro quo. Most
8 employers don't hand over their employees to the union
9 without something in exchange, either pre-negotiated
10 concessions at employee expense, such as an Adcock, or
11 an agreement not to strike or a political campaign such
12 as here.

13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You would argue that the
14 three items in dispute -- the access to property,
15 etc. -- that the consideration is the agreement to go
16 into arbitration, first of all, putting aside the
17 hundred thousand dollars.

18 MR. MESSENGER: The interest arbitration?

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The arbitration of
20 disputes that was promised by the employer and the union
21 under this agreement.

22 MR. MESSENGER: I wouldn't call that
23 consideration. I believe the consideration was, what
24 the union gave the employer was, the
25 hundred-thousand-dollar political campaign and the

1 agreement not to strike.

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Not to strike.

3 MR. MESSENGER: Yes, not to strike.

4 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Messenger, would your
5 argument apply to the following? I'm just going to give
6 you a few different kinds of promises. A promise to
7 give the union information about the company and its
8 finances?

9 MR. MESSENGER: During collective
10 bargaining, no, because it would fall under the final
11 clause of Section (c) (2).

12 JUSTICE KAGAN: But not if not during
13 collective bargaining?

14 MR. MESSENGER: Then if that had value to
15 the union, yes.

16 JUSTICE KAGAN: I'm sure it does.

17 An agreement giving the union a role in
18 grievance procedures?

19 MR. MESSENGER: No, because the grievance
20 procedures ultimately go to the employee. So a
21 grievance over, for example, should this employee get
22 back pay doesn't deliver anything to the union.

23 JUSTICE KAGAN: Could you explain that
24 distinction to me, ultimately go to the employee? I
25 mean, I assume that everything that the union does, the

1 union is saying, well, ultimately the benefits go to the
2 employee.

3 MR. MESSENGER: Well, but 302, its very
4 structure sort of differentiates the union from the
5 employee, so the thought of what's good for the union is
6 good for the employee is somewhat rejected implicitly in
7 302, that there's a separation there. The union is
8 supposed to act as their representative --

9 JUSTICE KAGAN: But the union, on the ones
10 that you say, well, the neutrality agreements, the
11 access, that's just to the union, the union can turn
12 around and say: No, ultimately it's to the employee,
13 that we're going to represent the employees well. So
14 the line you're drawing seems quite inadministrable to
15 me.

16 MR. MESSENGER: I believe I didn't perhaps
17 explain it correctly. It's not that if the union can
18 say this is good for employees, that's exculpatory. The
19 question is who gets the thing. In other words, 302 is
20 a very literal interpretation, not mine, but just going
21 back to the text, 302 requires the --

22 JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay, so the --

23 MR. MESSENGER: Payment or delivery -- I'm
24 sorry.

25 JUSTICE KAGAN: No, please.

1 MR. MESSENGER: Payment or delivery. So if
2 the thing is delivered to the employee and not to the
3 union itself, it's not covered. So, for example, the
4 original legislative history, they said what about the
5 wages to the employees and the supporting Senator
6 said --

7 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes, but my hypothetical is
8 the thing, was the union's role in grievance procedures.

9 MR. MESSENGER: Grievance procedures --

10 JUSTICE KAGAN: So the union gets it, right?

11 MR. MESSENGER: No. Because what -- I don't
12 believe that has any value intrinsically to the union.
13 A grievance procedure is simply a contractual mechanism
14 to do something else. So the question is what's -- in
15 other words, take arbitration. If you agree to
16 arbitrate something, what are they arbitrating? If
17 you're arbitrating over what the union gets, then, yes,
18 that could be illegal. But if you're arbitrating over
19 what goes to employees, the thing is delivered to the
20 employees.

21 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I guess I'll tell you
22 that a union that can say that it has a role in
23 grievance procedures is, that's an important thing for a
24 union to be able to tell its employees. That's of real
25 value to the union to have that.

1 MR. MESSENGER: But is the value coming from
2 the employer? Like, there the argument would be the
3 value is being given is the goodwill of employees
4 towards the union.

5 JUSTICE KAGAN: How about -- how about if a
6 company gives a union a role in company decision-making,
7 any kind, hiring, any other kind of company
8 decision-making? The company says, we want the union to
9 participate in this.

10 MR. MESSENGER: I would say probably not,
11 because what is ultimately the thing? Is it -- if they
12 gave it control perhaps over, like, you can now run the
13 auto shop and take the profits from it, then yes.
14 However, if it's merely, we'll listen to your input,
15 exactly is being given? Because I think it's
16 important -- Mulhall is not arguing for an expansive
17 interpretation of 302.

18 The three things that are actually at issue
19 here are rather direct things given directly to the
20 union: Lists of information, use of property. So if
21 you do move more to the fringes of things that may
22 create indirect benefits to unions, that may create some
23 problems and some difficulties. But the Court need not
24 reach those here to find organizing assistance to
25 violate the statute.

1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It's hard to think that
2 one really pays or lends or delivers, which is are
3 statutory words, neutrality of speech.

4 MR. MESSENGER: It would be control. That's
5 what pled, is you can deliver control over your
6 communications to another. And that's done in gag
7 clauses which are common in litigation, of course; and
8 also in noncompete agreements, which are intangible
9 assets for tax purposes. So those can -- that control
10 can be delivered to another party or paid if it is done
11 in consideration for something else.

12 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Messenger, the Excelsior
13 rule, if I understand it correctly, the NLRB says that
14 an employer absolutely has to give a list of
15 employees --

16 MR. MESSENGER: Yes.

17 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- to the union seven days
18 after an election is called; is that correct?

19 MR. MESSENGER: Not exactly. The employer
20 has to give a list to the NLRB, and then the NLRB
21 distributes it to all parties.

22 JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay, okay. But the union
23 gets it seven days after?

24 MR. MESSENGER: Eventually, yes.

25 JUSTICE KAGAN: And that's by requirement.

1 So you're suggesting that if the employer gives it six
2 days after, that's not only not required, that's
3 forbidden?

4 MR. MESSENGER: Yes.

5 JUSTICE KAGAN: So it goes within a period
6 of 24 hours, something that no employer can do
7 voluntarily to something that has to be done.

8 MR. MESSENGER: Yes, and the reason is it's
9 not the possession of the list that's somehow wrongful.
10 It's the fact that it's given by the employer, which
11 creates the danger: What will the union give in
12 exchange. That's the danger that 302 exists to take
13 care of, not that it's necessarily wrongful per se for a
14 union to have lists of information or the use of
15 property, but what will it do in return. And unions
16 have compromised employee interests in exchange for this
17 type of assistance. They certainly have extorted
18 employers. And here UNITE is willing to conduct a
19 hundred-thousand-dollar political campaign for this
20 information.

21 So, of course, in that hypothetical they'd
22 get it the next day anyway, so it would be rather
23 unusual for it to happen. But in a case like this where
24 the union can't request an election, that list is
25 extremely valuable to them. And as UNITE's conduct

1 shows, they value it enough to do something in exchange
2 for it.

3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is it -- we heard from
4 the other side that that hundred-thousand-dollar payment
5 for the ballot initiative was a benefit both because it
6 would mean that there would be many more workers
7 employed by the casino if they were allowed to go into
8 this new line of business. So that it wasn't payment to
9 the employer of something that is of benefit exclusively
10 to the employer. It was to the union's benefit too.

11 MR. MESSENGER: Yes. I mean, that's
12 probably -- that may be true. However, 302 doesn't
13 prohibit, as Mr. -- opposing counsel said, prohibit a
14 union from giving something to an employer.

15 Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

17 Mr. McCracken, you have four minutes
18 remaining.

19 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD G. McCRACKEN

20 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

21 MR. McCRACKEN: Thank you. On --

22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. McCracken --

23 MR. McCRACKEN: Yes.

24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: If I understood the
25 circuit below, it was suggesting, like the government,

1 that an exchange of agreements for purposes of peaceful
2 recognition, terms that were given for that purpose were
3 legal, but that things given for -- that were not solely
4 for recognition, had value outside of that, like money,
5 would be wrong.

6 That 100,000 is troubling to me because I
7 think what the circuit was saying is if the 100,000
8 bought the peaceful recognition provisions, then that's
9 corrupt, and that is outside the exemptions that the law
10 provides. That's how I read its decision.

11 Tell me why I'm wrong about that and tell me
12 how I deal with that niggling problem I have about the
13 \$100,000, because it does feel like a bribe to the
14 employer.

15 MR. McCracken: And the -- reading the
16 Eleventh Circuit's decision is actually somewhat
17 difficult, because the -- it appears that the court
18 suspected that there must be something else in the
19 picture that had not been disclosed and that's why it
20 ordered the district court to find out why the two
21 parties had cooperated with each other, despite the fact
22 that no one had alleged anything else in the picture
23 besides what is before us all now.

24 The -- so it seemed that the court was
25 puzzled that an employer would agree with the union to

1 cooperate in this fashion. The cooperation --

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I don't think it -- it
3 was puzzled by the provisions at issue. I think it was
4 puzzled by the 100,000.

5 MR. McCracken: Yes. And the -- the 100,000
6 was not a cash payment to anyone, although it might have
7 been. It might have been a contribution to a political
8 action committee that had been formed to advocate for
9 this initiative. But instead, it was actually the
10 union's own exercise of its speech and petition rights
11 as it campaigned for the passage of the initiative that
12 would allow the company to get into business in the
13 first place as a casino.

14 So, if the violation turns on the union's
15 exercise of its own First Amendment rights, then there's
16 a more severe problem here than Section 302, I believe.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but there was
18 a promise to exercise the First Amendment rights in a
19 particular way up to the amount of \$100,000.

20 MR. McCracken: Yes.

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That -- that's a
22 little different.

23 MR. McCracken: It's a little different, but
24 also very similar to the promises that are actually on
25 the face of the memorandum itself, because the union

1 agrees to waive its First Amendment rights to engage in
2 picketing and boycott activity, as well as the employer
3 waiving some of its rights with respect to its freedom
4 of speech.

5 So this is a case where there are multiple
6 waivers of rights, both speech rights and property
7 rights, going back and forth between the two parties for
8 a central, completely legitimate purpose, and that is,
9 the employer getting into business and the union getting
10 the opportunity to organize its employees. That's all
11 there is in this picture, is the union, like so many
12 construction unions that we know, advocating in Congress
13 for the passage of laws like the Keystone Pipeline Law.

14 Why did they do that? They do it because
15 they want the jobs. They hope that if they help the
16 industry develop a pipeline, that their members will
17 work on those jobs. That is a combination of interests
18 funneled through the First Amendment's protection for
19 mutual effort, as the Court recognized in Pennington,
20 and, of course, the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is one of
21 our most important constitutional protections.

22 That's all that happened in this case. So
23 there's nothing nefarious about it.

24 What -- there is -- there are some extremely
25 damaging things that the Respondents' very simplistic

1 argument will -- would accomplish if it were adopted.
2 Justice Kagan referred to the -- the grievance
3 procedure.

4 Well, there's also arbitration in this
5 agreement, as well as in collective bargaining
6 agreements. But one searches in vain in 302(c) for any
7 exception for arbitration, even though the Court has
8 said over so many years that it is the most important
9 thing under the Labor Management Relations Act.

10 Thank you.

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
12 Counsel.

13 The case is submitted.

14 (Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the case in the
15 above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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